Saturday, March 8, 2025

Aeschylus (Robert McNamara)

 

Robert S. McNamara, In retrospect : the tragedy and lessons of Vietnam, [1995] 

p.xvii
The ancient Greek dramatist Aeschylus wrote, “The reward of suffering is experience.”

p.29
We must be clear-sighted in beginnings, for, as in their budding we discern not the danger, so in their full growth we perceive not the remedy 
       ── Montaigne, Essays
  Michael Eyquem de Montaigne 

   ( In retrospect : the tragedy and lesson of Vietnam / Robert S. McNamara with Brian VanDeMark.──1st ed., 1. vietnam conflict, 1961─1975 ── united states., DS558.M44  1995, 959.704'3373──dc20, ) 
   ____________________________________

all things is dependence upon other things (buddhism)

 

An introduction to buddhism

An introduction to buddhism : teachings on the four noble truths, the eight verses on training the mind, and the lamp fo the path to enlightenment 
 The Dalai Lama
translated by Thupten Jinpa 

2004, 2003, 2018

pp.68-70
p.68
   When dealing with the everyday world, or “conventional reality” as it is called in Buddhist texts, naturally there is bound to be a large area of commonality between Buddhist and scientific explanations.  Where we find empirical evidence suggesting something to be the case, we must accept its validity because we are engaging in a common area of analysis.  
However, this is not to say that Buddhists believe that all phenomena [a fact, event, or condition that can be observed or perceived] can be understood simply by using our critical faculty and our ordinary mind, certainly not. 
p.69
Given the limits of our present cognitive ability, certain facts and phenomena may well lie outside the scope of our cognition, at least for the time being. 

phenomena [fact, event, or condition that can be experience by the senses (the brain, the nervous system, and the sensory organs: sight (eyes), sound (ears), feel (skin, body), smell (nose), taste (mouth, tongue, nose), feel (gut, stomach, air pressure (ears, body), ...)]

p.69
   In Buddhism, therefore, a distinction is made between three classes of phenomena.  One class of phenomena, known as “the evident”, comprises those phenomena that can be directly perceived through our sense and so on. 
The second is the class of “the slightly obscured”; phenomena that we can understand through inference, using reasoning of different phenomena. 
THe third category, known as “the extremely obscured”, refers to facts and phenomena which lie beyond our present ability to cognize. 
For the time being, an understanding of such phenomena can only arise on the basis of the testimony of someone who has gained direct experience of them; our acceptance of their validity has to be based initialy upon this valid testimony of a third person. 

p.69
   I often give an analogy to illustrate this third category of phenomena.  Most of us know our date of birth yet we did not acquire the knowledge of this fact first-hand.  We learned it through the testimony of our parents or someone else.  We accept it through the testimony of our parents or someone else.  We accept it as a valid statement because there is no reason why our parents should lie to us about this, and also because we rely on their words as authoritative figures.  Of course, sometimes there are exceptions to this rule.  For example, sometimes people increase their age to qualify for retirement benefits or reduce their age when seeking employment, and so on.  But generally we accept the testimony of a third person that such-and-such date is our date of birth. 

pp.69-70
   Buddhists accept this third class of “extremely obscured” phenomena on the basis of the scriptural authority of the Buddha.  However, our acceptance of that authority is not a simplistic one.  We don't just say, “Oh, the Buddha was a very holy person and since he said this I believe it to be true”.  There are certain underlying principles involved in the Buddhist acceptance of scripture-based authority.  One of these is the principle of the four reliances, which is generally stated as follows: 
   Rely on the teaching, not  on the person;
   Rely on the meaning, not on the word;
   Rely on the definitive meaning, not on the provisional;
   Rely on your wisdom mind, not on your ordinary mind.

p.70
On the basis of this principle of the four reliances we subject the authority of the Buddha, or any other great teacher, to critical analysis by examining the validity of their statements in other areas, especially those that in principle lend themselves to rational enquiry and empirical observation.  In addition, we must also examine the integrity of these authoritative figures to establish that they have no ulterior motive for disseminating falsehoods or making the specific claims that we are examining.  It is on the basis of such a thorough assessment that we accept the authority of the third person on questions that at present lie outside the scope of our ordinary mind to comprehend. 

An introduction to buddhism : teachings on the four noble truths, the eight verses on training the mind, and the lamp fo the path to enlightenment 
by The Dalai Lama
translated by Thupten Jinpa 
2004, 2003, 2018
   ____________________________________

“dependent origination”
“causal interdependence.”
[Pratītyasamutpāda][all things is dependence upon other things]
Everything effects everything else.  We are part of this system.
this process of dependent origination—causal relationships effected by everything that happens around us 

 ─ everything exists because of a prior cause
 ─ therefore, their existence  is without independent origination
 ─ lacking of independent origination
 ─ devoid of independent origination
 ─ “emptiness” of independent origination
 ─ lacking independent existence
 ─ all things arise from / upon other things
 ─ There is a combination of causes and conditions that is necessary for things to happen.
 ─ This principle is invariable and stable. 

in the affair of humanity and of other things, in human activities, I dare say, from most to all (n = whole set) cases, causes and conditions  come (arise)  from some things, came from some where, has a history, does not come out of nothing; immaculate conception and then birth is unlikely; there is parentage, a bloodline, hereditary; thus, the principle of dependent origination would apply.  

 Things don’t just happen. There is a combination of causes and conditions that is necessary for things to happen. This is really important in terms of our inner experience. It is not unusual to have the experience of ending up some­where, and not knowing how we got there. And feeling quite powerless because of the confusion present in that situation. Understanding how things come together, how they interact, actually removes that sense of powerless­ness or that sense of being a victim of life or helplessness. Because if we understand how things come together, we can also begin to understand the way out, how to find another way of being, and realize that life is not random chaos.

 The basic principle is that all things (dharmas, phenomena, principles) arise in dependence upon other things. 

sources:
         • An introduction to buddhism : teachings on the four noble truths, the eight verses on training the mind, and the lamp fo the path to enlightenment 
by The Dalai Lama
translated by Thupten Jinpa 
         • https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Prat%C4%ABtyasamutp%C4%81da
           https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Pratītyasamutpāda
           Pratītyasamutpāda (Sanskrit: 𑀧𑁆𑀭𑀢𑀻𑀢𑁆𑀬𑀲𑀫𑀼𑀢𑁆𑀧𑀸𑀤, Pāli: paṭiccasamuppāda), commonly translated as dependent origination
         • https://www.buddhistinquiry.org/article/dependent-origination/        
   ____________________________________

all things are connected, but most are loosely connected 

From 
        Evolving Reactions: 60 Years with March and Simon’s
‘Organizations’
written by Karl E. Weick, University of Michigan
Journal of Management Studies

   ...  ...  ... 
   ...  ...  ... 
   ...  ...  ... 


units are tight within and loose between.


THE MOSAIC FORM
‘Modules’ and ‘programmes’ are prominent nouns in ‘Organizations’. Equally prominent are portrayals of organizational fragments. These portrayals describe sub-units as self-contained, loosely coupled, segmented, departmentalized, decentralized, all of which represent a composite organization (p. 195). The prevailing image is one of tight, self-contained, loosely connected units. This image resembles that of a mosaic, as M&S notice:  ‘The whole pattern of programmed activity in an organization is a complicated mosaic of programme executions, each initiated by its appropriate program-evoking step’ (p. 149, italics added). As they say further on, ‘Since there are limits on the power,

K. E. Weick

speed and capacity of human cognition, most human behavior in organizations is constituted by a “mosaic of programs”’ (p. 172, italics added).  The image of a mosaic is shorthand for the observation that units, of whatever kind, are tight within and loose between. This insight, eventually expanded into the idea that organizations are loosely coupled systems (e.g., Glassman, 1973; Orton and Weick, 1990), was anticipated when M&S discussed simplification. When people with cognitive limits encounter complex problems, they scale down their action programs. ‘(E)ach action program is capable of being executed in semi-independence of the others – they are only loosely coupled together’ (p. 169).
     In a mosaic the whole does not precede the parts. Instead, the whole is a collection of parts that don’t lose their individuality when connected. In an interesting phrasing, M&S observe that it takes efficient communication to ‘tolerate interdependence’ (p.162). This is one reason why M&S are able to get so much mileage out of concepts anchored in individual behaviour. Organizations aggregate ‘very large numbers of elements, each element, taken by itself, being exceedingly simple’ (p. 178). The working assumption seems to be that an organization is a mosaic of loosely coupled subunits whose members are more or less likely to invoke a shared mental set when assigned a task. Said differently, organizations can be portrayed as differentiated tight modules connected loosely by influence processes. There is a timeless quality to this basic pattern which accounts, in part, for its continuing relevance.
     For example, the basic pattern is evident in Simon’s (1962) ‘empty world hypothesis’ – most things are only weakly connected with most other things (p. 111). That pattern of tight within stable sub-assemblies and loose between them, was evident in 1958 when M&S discussed planning (pp. 176–7). If the world is empty and most events are unrelated to other events, then local changes in action programmes are sufficient. However, even in a mostly empty world, there are still minimal connections among programmes since ‘they all draw upon the resources of the organization’ (p. 176). As Simon was to put it later, ‘for a tolerable description of reality only a tiny fraction of all possible interactions needs to be taken into account. By adopting a descriptive language that allows the absence of something to go unmentioned, a nearly empty world can be described quite concisely.  Mother Hubbard did not have to check off the list of possible contents to say that her cupboard was bare’ (p. 473).
   ...  ...  ... 



source:
        Evolving Reactions: 60 Years with March and Simon’s
‘Organizations’
written by Karl E. Weick, University of Michigan
Journal of Management Studies
doi: 10.1111/joms.12289
56:8 December 2019

REFERENCES

   Bakken, T. and Hernes, T. (2006). ‘Organizing is both a verb and a noun: Weick meets Whitehead’.  Organization Studies, 27, 1599–616.

   Barnard, C. I. (1938). The Functions of the Executive. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University.

   Bengtsson, B. and Hertting, N. (2014). ‘Generalization by mechanism thin rationality and ideal-type analysis in case study research’. Philosophy of the Social Sciences, 44, 707–32.

   Berlin, I. (2013). The Hedgehog and the Fox: An Essay on Tolstoy’s View of History. Princeton, NJ: Princeton
University Press.
   
   Campbell, D. T. (1969). ‘Ethnocentrism of disciplines and the fish-scale model of omniscience’. In Sherif, M. and Sherif, C. W. (Eds), Interdisciplinary Relations in the Social Sciences, Chicago, IL: Aldine, 328–48.

   Colquitt, J. A. and Zapata-Phelan, C. P. (2007). ‘Trends in theory building and theory testing:
A five-decade study of the Academy of Management Journal’. Academy of Management Journal, 50,
1281–303.

   Davis, G. F. (2010). ‘Do theories of organizations progress?’ Organizational Research Methods, 13, 690–709.

   Davis, G. F. and Marquis, C. (2005). ‘Prospects for organization theory in the early twenty-first century: Institutional fields and mechanisms’. Organization Science, 16, 332–43.

   Farjoun, M. and Starbuck, W. H. (2007). ‘Organizing at and beyond the limits’. Organization Studies, 28, 541–66.

   Feldman, M. S. (2000). ‘Organizational routines as a source of continuous change’. Organization Science, 11, 611–29.

   Festinger, L. (1957). A Theory of Cognitive Dissonance. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press.

   Fine, G. A. (1991). ‘On the macrofoundations of microsociology: Constraint and the exterior reality of tructure’. Sociological Quarterly, 32, 161–77.
 
   Glassman, R. B. (1973). ‘Persistence and loose coupling in living systems’. Systems Research and Behavioral Science, 18, 83–98.

   Hutchins, J. G. B. (1960). ‘Reviewed works: Higher education for business by Robert A. Gordon, James E. Howell; The education of American business men: A study in university-college programs in business administration by Frank C. Pierson’. Administrative Science Quarterly, 5, 279–95.

   James, W. (1987). Writings 1902–1910. New York: Library of America.
Kahneman, D. (2003). ‘Maps of bounded rationality: Psychology for behavioral economics’. American Economic Review, 93, 1449–75.

   Kilduff, M. (1993). ‘Deconstructing organizations’. Academy of Management Review, 18, 13–31.

   Koch, S. E. (1959). Psychology: A Study of a Science. New York: McGraw Hill. 

   Lindzey, G. E. (1954). Handbook of Social Psychology. Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley.

   March, J. G. (2008). Explorations in Organizations. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press.

   March, J. G. and Simon, H. A. (1958). Organizations. New York: Wiley.
Merton, R. K. (1948). ‘The self-fulfilling prophecy’. The Antioch Review, 8, 193–210.

   Merton, R. K. (1998). On the Shoulders of Giants: A Shandean Postscript. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press.

   Orton, J. D. and Weick, K. E. (1990). ‘Loosely coupled systems: A reconceptualization’. Academy of Management Review, 15, 203–23.

   Simon, H. A. (1962). ‘The Architecture of complexity’. Proceedings of the American Philosophical Society, 106, 467–82.

   Stinchcombe, A. (1982). ‘Should sociologists forget their mothers and fathers?’ The American Sociologist, 17, 2–11.

   Thoenig, J. C. (1998). ‘Essai: How far is a sociology of organizations still needed?’ Organization Studies, 19, 307–20.

   Turner, B. A. and Pidgeon, N. F. (1997). Man-Made Disasters, 2nd edition. Oxford: Butterworth-Heinemann.

   Weick, K. E. (1979). The Social Psychology of Organizing, 2nd edition. Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley.

   Whyte, W. F. (1948). ‘The social structure of the restaurant’. American Journal of Sociology, 54, 302–10.

   Whyte, W. H Jr. (1956). The Organization Man. New York: Simon & Schuster.
   ____________________________________

Charles Perrow, Normal accidents : living with high-risk technologies, 1999 [ ]

Perrow, Charles.
Normal accidents : living with high-risk technologies / Charles Perrow
1. industrial accidents.
2. technology--risk assessment.
3. accident.

HD7262  P55  1999
363.1--dc21

pp.4-5
But suppose the system is also “tightly coupled”, that is, processes happen very fast and can't be turned off, the failed parts cannot be isolated from other parts, or there is no other way to keep the production going safely. Then recovery from the initial disturbance is not possible; it will spread quickly and irretrievably for at least some time. Indeed, operator action or the safety systems may make it worse, since for a time it is not known what the problem really is. 
   Probably many production processes started out this way──complexly interactive and tightly coupled. But with experience, better designs, equipment, and procedures appeared, and the unsuspected interactions were avoided and the tight coupled reduced. This appears to have happened in the case of air traffic control, where interactive complexity and tight coupling have been reduced by better organization and “technological fixes”. 

p.8
DEPOSE components (for design, equipment, procedures, operators, supplies and materials, and environment). 

p.8
   That accident had its cause in the interactive nature of the world for us that morning and in its tight coupling──not in the discrete failures, which are to be expected and which are guarded against with backup systems. Most of the time we don't notice the inherent coupling in our world, because most of the time there are no failures, or the failures that occur do not interact. But all of a sudden, things that we did not realize could be linked (buses and generators, coffee and a loaned key) became linked. The system is suddenly more tightly coupled than we had realized. 

p.9
In complex industrial, space, and military systems, the normal accident generally (not always) means that the interactions are not only unexpected, but are  incomprehensible  for some critical period of time. In part this is because in these human-machine systems the interactions literally cannot be seen.  In part it is because, even if they are seen, they are not believed.  As we shall find out and as Robert Jervis and Karl Weick have noted,3 seeing is not necessarily believing; sometimes, we must believe before we can see. 
   3. Robert Jervis, Perception and Misperception in International Politics (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton university press, 1976); and Karl Wieck, “Educational Organizations as Loosely Coupled Systems”, Administrative Science Quarterly 21:1 (March, 1976): 1-19. 

p.73
1967, according to a perceptive and disturbing article by one of the editors of Nuclear Safety, E. W. Hagen.4 

p.73
Hagen concludes that potential common-mode failures are “the result of adding complexity to system designs”. Ironically, in many cases, the complexity is added to reduce common-mode failures. 
p.73
The addition of redundant components has been the main line of defense, but, as Hagen illustrates, also the main source of the failure. “To date, all proposed ‘fixes’ are for more of the same──more components and more complexity in system design.”5  The Rasmussen safety study relied upon a  “PRA” (probabilities risk analysis), finding that core melts and the like were virtually impossible. 

, finding that core melts and the like were virtually impossible. [[ see list of nuclear power plant "accident" that has core melts down ]]

p.73
The main problem is complexity itself, Hagen argues. 


pp.93-94
1. Tightly coupled systems have more time-dependent processes: they cannot wait or stand by until attended to.
Reactions, as in chemical plants, are almost instantaneous and cannot be delayed or extended. 

2. The sequences in tightly coupled systems are more invariant. 

3. In tightly coupled systems, not only are the specific sequences invariant, but the overall design of the process allows only one way to reach the production goals. 
Loosely coupled systems are said to have “equifinality”──many ways to skin the cat; tightly coupled ones have “unifinality”. 

4. Tightly coupled systems have little slack. 
In loosely coupled systems, supplies and equipment and human power can be wasted without great cost to the system. 

pp.94-95
In a tightly coupled systems the buffers and redundancies and substitutions must be designed in; they must be thought of in advance.  In loosely coupled systems there is a better chance that expedient, spur-of-the-moment buffers and redundancies and substitutes can be found, even though they were not planned ahead of time. 
p.95
But in tightly coupled systems, the recovery aids are largely limited to deliberate, designed-in aids, such as engineered safety devices (in a nuclear plant, emergency coolant pumps and an emergency supply coolant) or engineered safety features (a more general category, which would include a buffering wall between the core and the source of coolant). While some jury-rigging is possible, such possibilities are limited, because of time-dependent sequences, invariant sequences, unifinality, and the absence of slack. 
p.95
In loosely coupled systems, in addition to ESDs (emergency safety device) and ESFs (engineered safety device), fortuitous recovery aids are often possible. 
p.95
Tightly coupled systems offer few such opportunities. Whether the interactions are complex or linear, they cannot be temporarily altered. 
p.95
   This does not mean that loosely coupled systems necessarily have sufficient designed-in safety devices; typically, designers perceive they have a safety margin in the form of fortuitous safety devices, and neglect to install even quite obvious ones. 

p.96
    Table 3.2
  Tight and loose coupling tedencies
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------
   Tight Coupling                              Loose Coupling
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Delays in processing not possible           Processing delays possible 
Invariant sequences                         Order of sequences can be changed
Only one method to achieve goal             Alternative methods available 
Little slack possible in supplies,          Slack in resources possible 
 equipment, personnel
Buffers and redundancies are designed-in,   Buffers and redundancies 
 deliberate                                  fortuitiously available 
Substitutes of supplies, equipment,         Substitutions fortuitously 
 personnel limited and designed-in           available 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------

   ( Normal accidents : living with high-risk technologies / Charles Perrow, 1. industrial accidents., 2. technology--risk assessment., 3. accident., HD7262  P55  1999, 363.1--dc21, 1999,  )
   ____________________________________
·‘’•─“”
<------------------------------------------------------------------------>
πόλλ' οἶδ' ἀλώπηξ,ἀλλ' ἐχῖνος ἓν μέγα πόλλ' οἶδ' ἀλώπηξ,ἀλλ' ἐχῖνος ἓν μέγα
   ____________________________________
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     (Ackoff's best : his classic writings on management, Russell L. Ackoff., © 1999, hardcover, John Wiley & Sons, Inc., p.139)

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Colin Powell (experience judgment)

 

Colin Powell with Tony Koltz., It worked for me : in life and leadership, 2012

p.12
As the saying goes, “Good judgment comes from experience, and experience comes from bad judgment.”

p.169
Learning and improvement are the sole focus, not the unit's success or failure 

  (It worked for me : in life and leadership / Colin Powell with Tony Koltz. ── 1st ed., 1. Powell, Colin L., 2. African American generals ── biography., 3. united states ── politics and government ── 1993-2001 ── quotations, maxims, etc., 4. leadership ── united states., E840.5.P68A3  2012, 973.931092──dc23,  2012, )
   ____________________________________

diagnosis of problems (NAG)

    ____________________________________
p.72
creation of a net assessment group (NAG)

p.73
“diagnosis of problems and opportunities, rather than recommended actions”.
For Marshall, the focus on diagnosis rather than solutions was especially significant.149
basis for diagnosis.
  do we have problems?
  if so, how big is it?
  is it getting worse or better?
  what are the underlying causes? 

p.83
Pedagogically, Marshall believes that allowing others to work out how to do a net assessment is preferrable to him trying to explain it to them.  
that of a shepherd guiding others' intellectual growth to help them arrive at their own conclusions through an intensive process.6 
It must be learned experientially. 

p.38
intellectual comfort zones rather than address harder questions. 
pp.38-39
Observing this approach reinforced an enduring lesson for Marshall:  mediocre answers to good questions were more important and useful than splendid answers to poor questions.114 

p.37
Kelly AFB in San Antonio, where the Air Force conducted most of its COMINT analysis.109

p.38
Loftus and Marshall's rare access to COMINT helped them understand this disconnect, though they could not share this information to shatter their colleagues' illusions.  


source:
        John Schutte, ‘Andrew W. Marshall and the Epistemic Community of the Cold War’, 2015, http://www.au.af.mil/au/aupress/digital/pdf/paper/dp_0016_schutte_casting_net_assessment.pdf

dp_0016_schutte_casting_net_assessment.pdf

Schutte, John M., 1976
  Casting net assessment : Andrew W. Marshall and the epistemic community of the cold war / John M. Schutte, Lieutenant Colonel, USAF.
1. Marshall, Andrew W., 1921─ 2. United States. department of defense. director of net assessment ── biography. 3. united states. department of defense ── officials and employees ── biography. 4. rand corporation ── biography. 5. united states ── forecasting. 6. military planning ── united states ── history ── 20th century. 7. military planning ── united states ── history ── 21st century. 8. united states ── military policy. 9. strategy. 10. cold war. 
title: Andrew W. Marshall and the epistemic community of the cold war. 

UA23.6.S43 2014
355.0092 -- dc23

local filename:  casting net assessment.txt
alternative short-cut:  Andrew W. Marshall and the epistemic community of the cold war (2)
   ____________________________________
p.38
intellectual comfort zones rather than address harder questions. 
   ____________________________________

Angler: the Cheney vice presidency, Barton Gellman, 2008

p.201
to draw the lines between environmental and economic interests.

p.202
His staff scouted ahead trying to find out who had the big picture on Klamath.

p.203
Cheney to Sue Ellen Wooldridge, over a phone call
  “If we're going to put a bunch of farmers out of business, we've got a problem. We've got a massive problem.”

p.203
  “I never got any directives”, Wooldrige said, only questions: 
  “What is the status?  
   What is happening?  
   What decisions do you need to make?  
   What discretion do you have?”

    (Angler: the Cheney vice presidency, Barton Gellman, 2008, )
    ____________________________________

written by James Bamford (The puzzle palace), 1982

pp.377-378
  “HUMINT [Human Intelligence] is subject to all of the mental aberrations of the source as well as the interpreter of the source,” Lieutenant General Marshall S. Carter once explained. “SIGINT isn't. SIGINT has technical aberrations which give it away almost immediately if it does not have bona fides, if it is not legitimate. A good analyst can tell very, very quickly whether this is an attempt at disinformation, at confusion, from SIGINT. You can't do that from HUMINT; you don't have the bona fides ── what are his sources? He may be the source, but what are his sources?”
  Having served as deputy director of the CIA and director of the NSA, Carter was one of the very few people to have been intimately associated with both collection systems, and in his opinion SIGINT won by a wavelength. “Photo interpretation,” he explained, “can in some cases be misinterpreted by the reader or intentionally confused by the maker in the first place ── camouflage, this sort of thing. SIGINT is the one that is immediate, right now. Photo interpretation, yes, to some extent, but you still have to say, ‘Is that really a fake, have they confused it?’ It is better than HUMINT, it is more rapid than HUMINT [but] SIGINT is right now; its bona fides are there the minute you get it.”
   ____________________________________
p.16 (QMJ 94 Fall) 
The technical lectures

In lecture 1, “controlled and uncontrolled variation”, Deming introduced the Shewhart statistical control chart as a tool for bringing a production process into control.  He set the tone for this lecture with the opening remark, “Variability is a rule in nature.  Repetitions of any procedure will produce variable results.”
   Deming followed with definitions of controlled and uncontrolled variation, principally in terms of whether it is (controlled variation) or is not (uncontrolled variation) profitable to try to determine the causes.  This economic definition is the same spirit as that offered in the original book of Shewhart (1931).  Deming then called uncontrolled 
variation a type of “trouble”, and introduced the costs of two kinds of mistakes:  “Hunting for trouble and making adjustments when no trouble exists, and ... failing to hunt for trouble and not taking action when trouble does exist.”  Deming offered the control chart as the most “economical solution” to this problem. 

source:
        what deming told the Japanese in 1950 
        DeminginJapanin1950.pdf
        Peter J. Kolesar, Columbia university
        QMJ 94 Fall 
        
The primary source documents are the published lecture transcripts that Deming considered authentic. 

The transcripts how that Deming introduced to the Japanese a product design cycle of Shewhart that is distinct from the management process that the Japanese later came to call the plan-do-check-act cycle. 

Deming cycle of the plan-do-check-act (PDCA) cycle development, variation, evolution, iteration  
   Figure 2   The Deming/Shewhart design cycle (Deming 1951), p.14
   Figure 3   The Deming PDSA cycle (Deming 1986)., p.15 
   Figure 4   The Mizuno PDCA control circle (Mizuno 1984), p.16  
   ____________________________________

        the first private awareness that human error is a symptom of trouble deeper inside a system, and to explain that failure, do not try to find where the people went wrong; instead, find out how people's assessments and actions made sense at the time, given the circumstances that surrounded them; What were they thinking? - “The reconstruction of the mindset begins not with the mind. It begins with the circumstances in which the mind found itself.”, Dekker (2002);--Heather Parker, Transport Canada slide presentation, titled, Investigating and Analysing Human and Organizational Factors, 2006-11-09;      
   ____________________________________
<------------------------------------------------------------------------>

 •── “false positives.” :  The first error is overdiagnosis--when an individual tests positive in the test but does not have cancer. Such individuals are called “false positives.” Men and women who falsely test positive find themselves trapped in the punitive stigma of cancer, the familiar cycle of anxiety and terror (and the desire to “do something”) that precipitates further testing and invasive treatment., pp.291-292, Siddhartha Mukherjee, The emperor of all maladies, 2010.               
    
           • false 
          positive -  “Hunting for trouble and making adjustments 
                       when no trouble exists, and ... ”, 
                       what deming told the Japanese in 1950, DeminginJapanin1950.pdf, Peter J. Kolesar, Columbia university, p.16 (QMJ 94 Fall)   
                   -  fishing expedition 
by Anthony Lane
p.65
  To be accused of an offense that you haven't committed is a terrible slur, and it can lead to a galling miscarriage of justice [[ ? ]].  To be innocent of an offense and yet to confess your guilt ─ not for pathological reasons but purely to get ahead in the world ─ takes a certain panache. 
  (The current cinema, Over the limit, "Ferrari"  and  "The crime is mine",   The new yorkers, January 1 & 8, 2024., p.65)


 •── “false negatives” : The mirror image of overdiagnosis is underdiagnosis--an error in which a patient truly has cancer but does not test positive for it. Underdiagnosis falsely reassures  patients of their freedom from disease. These men and women (“false negatives” in the jargon of epidemiology) enter a different punitive cycle--of despair, shock, and betrayal--once their disease, undetected by the screening test, is eventually uncovered when it becomes symptomatic., pp.291-292, Siddhartha Mukherjee, The emperor of all maladies, 2010. 

           • false 
          negative -  “failing to hunt for trouble and not taking action 
                       when trouble does exist.”, 
                       what deming told the Japanese in 1950, DeminginJapanin1950.pdf, Peter J. Kolesar, Columbia university, p.16 (QMJ 94 Fall)
                   -  neglect
by Anthony Lane
p.65
  To be accused of an offense that you haven't committed is a terrible slur, and it can lead to a galling miscarriage of justice.  To be innocent of an offense and yet to confess your guilt ─ not for pathological reasons but purely to get ahead in the world ─ takes a certain panache [[ ?? ]]. 
  (The current cinema, Over the limit, "Ferrari"  and  "The crime is mine",   The new yorkers, January 1 & 8, 2024., p.65)


Siddhartha Mukherjee, The emperor of all maladies, 2010              [ ]
pp.291-292
Suppose a new test has been invented in the laboratory to detect an early, presympotamic stage of a particular form of cancer, say, the level of a protein secreted by cancer cells into the serum. The first challenge for such a test is technical: its performance in the real world. Epidemiologists think of screening tests as possessing two characteristic performance errors. The first error is overdiagnosis--when an individual tests positive in the test but does not have cancer. Such individuals are called “false positives.” Men and women who falsely test positive find themselves trapped in the punitive stigma of cancer, the familiar cycle of anxiety and terror (and the desire to “do something”) that precipitates further testing and invasive treatment.
   ([ see pregnancy test ])
   The mirror image of overdiagnosis is underdiagnosis--an error in which a patient truly has cancer but does not test positive for it. Underdiagnosis falsely reassures  patients of their freedom from disease. These men and women (“false negatives” in the jargon of epidemiology) enter a different punitive cycle--of despair, shock, and betrayal--once their disease, undetected by the screening test, is eventually uncovered when it becomes symptomatic.
   The trouble is that overdiagnosis and underdiagnosis are often intrinsically conjoined, locked perpetually on two ends of a seesaw. Screening tests that strive to limit overdiagnosis--by narrowing the criteria by which patients are classified as positive--often pay the price of increasing underdiagnosis because they miss patients that lie in the gray zone between positive and negative. An example helps to illustrate this tradeoff. Suppose--to use Egan's vivid metaphor--a spider is trying to invent a perfect web to capture flies out of the air. Increasing the density of that web, she finds, certainly increases the chances of capturing junk and debris floating through the air (false positives). Making the web less dense, in contrast, decreases the chances of catching real prey, but every time something is captured, chances are higher that it is a fly. In cancer, where both overdiagnosis and underdiagnosis come at high costs, finding that exquisite balance is often impossible. We want every cancer test to operate with perfect specificity and sensitivity. But the technologies for screening are not perfect. Screening tests thus routinely fail because they cannot even cross this preliminary hurdle--the rate of over- or underdiagnosis is unacceptably high.

   (The emperor of all maladies : a biography of cancer, Siddhartha Mukherjee, 2010, ) 
   ____________________________________

the costs of two kinds of mistakes:  “Hunting for trouble and making adjustments when no trouble exists, and ... failing to hunt for trouble and not taking action when trouble does exist.” 

“Hunting for trouble and making adjustments when no trouble exists, and ...” 
“failing to hunt for trouble and not taking action when trouble does exist.”

   false     h       4   t       a   m      a     wnte   
positive -  “Hunting for trouble and making adjustments 
                   when no trouble exists, and ... ” 
   false     f       2  h    4   t       a   n   t      a     wtde 
negative  - “failing to hunt for trouble and not taking action 
                   when trouble does exist.”
 
           • false 
          positive -  “Hunting for trouble and making adjustments 
                       when no trouble exists, and ... ”, 
                       what deming told the Japanese in 1950, DeminginJapanin1950.pdf, Peter J. Kolesar, Columbia university, p.16 (QMJ 94 Fall)
 
           • false 
          negative -  “failing to hunt for trouble and not taking action 
                       when trouble does exist.”, 
                       what deming told the Japanese in 1950, DeminginJapanin1950.pdf, Peter J. Kolesar, Columbia university, p.16 (QMJ 94 Fall)


p.16 (QMJ 94 Fall) 
The technical lectures

In lecture 1, “controlled and uncontrolled variation”, Deming introduced the Shewhart statistical control chart as a tool for bringing a production process into control.  He set the tone for this lecture with the opening remark, “Variability is a rule in nature.  Repetitions of any procedure will produce variable results.”
   Deming followed with definitions of controlled and uncontrolled variation, principally in terms of whether it is (controlled variation) or is not (uncontrolled variation) profitable to try to determine the causes.  This economic definition is the same spirit as that offered in the original book of Shewhart (1931).  Deming then called uncontrolled 
variation a type of “trouble”, and introduced the costs of two kinds of mistakes:  “Hunting for trouble and making adjustments when no trouble exists, and ... failing to hunt for trouble and not taking action when trouble does exist.”  Deming offered the control chart as the most “economical solution” to this problem. 


source:
        what deming told the Japanese in 1950 
        DeminginJapanin1950.pdf
        Peter J. Kolesar, Columbia university
        QMJ 94 Fall 
        https://curiouscat.com/management/deming/deming-1950-japan-speech-mt-hakone
   ____________________________________

pdf page 21 
The linkage of beliefs and sampling processes is brought to the fore in a line of recent work (Denrell & March, 2001; Le Mens & Denrell, 2011). 

Since an adaptive organization is naturally going to sample alternatives for which it has more positive beliefs, then beliefs that are in some sense a “false positive”, a not particularly promising alternative viewed favorably, will ultimately be corrected. 

However, a “false negative”, a latently promising alternative that is viewed unfavorably, will be unlikely to be sampled and this inaccurate negative belief will persist, despite the organization being nominally adaptive.


pdf page 22 
Hierarchical organizational forms tend to be quite cautious and are very unlikely to make Type I errors of accepting inferior alternatives, but as a result of such caution tend to become trapped by local peaks. 


source: 
       Giovanni Gavetti*, Henrich R. Greve, Daniel A. Levinthal, William Ocasio, The behavioral theory of the firm : assessment and prospects,  june 2012. 
        
The academy of management annals
vol. 6, no. 1, june 2012, 1─40

The behavioral theory of the firm : assessment and prospects

Giovanni Gavetti*
  harvard business school

Henrich R. Greve
  instead

Daniel A. Levinthal
  wharton school, university of pennsylvania

William Ocasio
  kellogg school of management, northwestern university
   ____________________________________

Niel Postman, Amusing ourselves to death : public discourse in the age of show business, new introduction by Andrew Postman [2005], [1985]

p.102
If on television, credibility replaces reality as the decisive test of truth-telling, political leaders need not trouble themselves very much with reality provided their performances consistently generate a sense of verisimilitude. 

p.102
For the alternative possibilities are that one may look like a liar but be telling the truth; or even worse, look like a truth-teller but in fact be lying. 

  (Amusing ourselves to death./ Niel Postman, bibliography: p. 173., includes index., 1. mass media ── influence.,  P94.P63  1986,  302.2'34,  86-9513, A section of this book was supported by a commission from the Annenberg scholars program, Annenberg school of communications, university of southern california.  SPecifically, portions of chapters six and seven formed part of a paper delivered at the scholars conference, “Creating meaning : literacies of our time”, February 1984., [1985] )
   ____________________________________

 ── There is no point at which one can focus one's efforts to reach the better arrangement because one is not even aware that there is a better arrangement.  


Edward de Bono, Lateral Thinking: a textbook of creativity, 1970, 1977, 1990 

 ── the problem of no problem.  One is blocked by the adequacy of the present arrangement from moving to a much better one.  
 ── There is no point at which one can focus one's efforts to reach the better arrangement because one is not even aware that there is a better arrangement.  

pp.41-42
Problem solving 

A problem does not have to be presented in a formal manner nor is it a matter for pencil and paper working out.  A problem is simply the difference between what one has and what one wants.  It may be a matter of avoiding something, of getting something, of getting rid of something, of getting to know what one wants. 

   There are three-types of problem: 
    • The first type of problem requires for its solution more information or better techniques for handling information. 
    • The second type of problem requires no new information but a rearrangement of information already available:  an insight restructuring. 
    • The third type of problem is the problem of no problem.  One is blocked by the adequacy of the present arrangement from moving to a much better one.  There is no point at which one can focus one's efforts to reach the better arrangement because one is not even aware that there is a better arrangement.  The problem is to realize that ‘there is a problem’ to realize that ‘things can be improved’ and to define ‘this realization as a problem’. 

   The first type of problem can be solved by vertical thinking.  The second and third type of problem require lateral thinking for their solution. 

p.30
Vertical thinking is analytical, lateral thinking is provocative

One may consider three different attitude to the remark of a student who had come to the conclusion:  “Ulysses was a hypocrite.”

  1. “You are wrong, Ulysses was not a hypocrite.”
  2. “How very interesting, tell me how you reached that conclusion.”
  3. “very well. What happens next? How are you going to go forward from that idea?”

  In order to be able to use provocative qualities of lateral thinking one must also be able to follow up with the selective qualities of vertical thinking. 

p.35
Lateral thinking is a description of a process not of a result. 

pp.35-36
It is always possible to describe a logical pathway in hindsight once a solution is spelled out.  But being able to reach that solution by means of this hindsight pathway is another matter.  One can demonstrate this quite simply by offering certain problems which are difficult to solve and yet when solved, the solution is obvious.  In such cases, it is impossible to suppose that what make the problem difficult was lack of the elementary logic required. 

   It is characteristic of insight solutions and new ideas that they should be obvious after they have been found.  In itself, this shows how insufficient logic is in practice, otherwise such simple solutions must have occurred much earlier.  

p.36
In practical terms however, it is quite obvious that the hindsight demonstration of a logical pathway does not indicate that the solution would have been reached in this way. 

p.37
Lateral thinking is more concerned with concept breaking, with provocation and disruption in order to allow the mind to restructure patterns. 

p.37
There is nothing mysterious about lateral thinking. It is a way of handling information. 

  (Edward de Bono, Lateral Thinking: a textbook of creativity, 1970, 1977, 1990, ) 
   ____________________________________

discover a problem people have previously never seen

 

Dave Oliver, Against the tide, 2014                               [ ]

p.155
    7. ... This should amply demonstrate that all management systems depending on people will occasionally (or more often) either run amuck or, more likely, fail to recognize the precise situation they were installed to detect. Rickover taught that if one does not have at least three independent check systems for what is considered important, one does not have a system. However, often no number of independent checks will suffice to discover a problem people have previously never seen. 

   (Against the tide : Rickover's leadership principles and the rise of the nuclear Navy / Rear Admiral Dave Oliver, USN (Ret.)., 1. Rickover, Hyman George., 2. admirals--united states--biography., 3. united states. navy--officers--biography., 4. nuclear submarines--united states--history--20th century., 5. nuclear warships--united states--safety measures--history., 6. marine nuclear reactor plants--united states--safety measures--history., 7. united states. navy--management., 8. leadership--united states., 2014, )
   ____________________________________

Ellsberg Halberstam Taylor

 Daniel Ellsberg, Secrets : a memoir of vietnam and the pentagon papers, 2002 

pp.185─186 
; an operation eight months later in the same paddies that was not even aware American troops had ever visited them before.  AS Tran Ngoc Chau said to me in 1968, “You Americans feel you have been fighting this was for seven years. You have not. You have been fighting it for one year, seven times.”

p.188
David Halberstam and Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr.
the policy of one more step 
each new step always promising the success which the previous last step had also promised but had unaccountably failed to deliver.
Each step in the deepening of the American commitment was reasonably regarded at the time as the last that would be necessary. 

p.189
This included Truman's decision to support the French effort directly in 1950, Eisenhower's commitment to Diem in 1954, and Kennedy's decision to break through the Geneva ceiling on U.S. advisers in 1961.
   Within a month of working from the files in the McNamara study offices, I had discovered that this assumption was mistaken.  Every one of these crucial decisions was secretly associated with realistic internal pessimism, deliberately concealed from the public, just as in 1964─65.

([  David Halberstam, The coldest winter

David Halberstam, The coldest winter : America and the Korean war, [2007]

Matt Ridgway
pp.488─489
There were at least three moments  in his career when his country  had reason think of him as someone who, by dint of intelligence and character, set himself apart from his peers. 
The first was when he lead the airborne assault on France on D-day in June 1944.
The second was in 1954, after elite French forces had been trapped by the Vietminh at Dien Bien Phu and pressures grew on the Americans to come to their aid. 
p.489
The second was in 1954, after elite French forces had been trapped by the Vietminh at Dien Bien Phu and pressures grew on the Americans to come to their aid.  At that time, as chief of staff of the Army, he wrote a memo so forceful in assessing the extremely high cost of an American entry into the war in French Indochina (and the potential lack of popularity among the Vietnamese of such a war) that President Dwight Eisenhower, on reading it, put aside any idea of intervention. 

p.489
   But there was an earlier, perhaps even more instructive moment that caught his character perfectly, thought the military historian Ken Hamburger.  By June 1944, he was already the Great Ridgway and people listened to him.  But in September 1943, he had managed to talk his superiors out of what would surely have been an ill-fated and tragic airborne assault on Rome.  He had done that at a moment when he had comparatively little status in the upper echelons of the military hierarchy.  It was in the middle of the Italian campaign, and the Italian government, officially still part of the Axis along with Germany and Japan, was about to make a separate peace with the Allies.  Marshal Pietro Badoglio, the Italian commander, had suggested that an American airborne division make a parachute jump into Rome to link up with the Italian army, which would then turn its guns on the Germans.  Ridgway's division was slate to make the jump, but to him, everything about the plan smelled wrong.  He had no way to validate the words of Badoglio ── would he do as promised, and even if he did, would it make any difference, given the formidable quality of the German troops in the Italian capital?  The risk to his men, Ridgway thought was unacceptable.  So he had begun to fight his way through a rather casual command structure that was all too ready to take Badoglio's word at face value. 
p.489
   Even as D-day for his mission approached, with all his superiors signed on, surprisingly few questions had been asked about Badoglio's ability to pull off his sudden switch.
When Ridgway first challenged his superiors, they were initially quite indifferent to his concerns.  
At the last minute, Ridgway sent one of his deputies, Maxwell Taylor, on a daring mission behind German lines to meet with the Italians and recon the situation.  Better, he believed, Taylor's eyes and ears than Badoglio's promises.  
pp.489─490
Taylor reported back that all of Ridgway's doubts were valid:  the Italians were in no position to fight as promised, and his airborne division might well be completely destroyed.  
p.490
Then, with his men already in their planes and the engines warming up, the mission was called off.  That night Ridgway had shared a bottle of whiskey with a close friend, and then, drained by the closeness of disaster, he began to cry. 
‘’•─“”

([  Maxwell D. Taylor, Swords and plowshares

Maxwell D. Taylor, Swords and plowshares, [1972]

At the last minute, Ridgway sent one of his deputies, Maxwell Taylor, on a daring mission behind German lines to meet with the Italians and recon the situation.  Better, he believed, Taylor's eyes and ears than Badoglio's promises.  

 4  missions in Italy                   56

pp.489─490
Taylor reported back that all of Ridgway's doubts were valid:  the Italians were in no position to fight as promised, and his airborne division might well be completely destroyed.  


contents

illustrations                         11
acknowledgements                      13
foreward                              15

 1  gestation of a second lieutenant    21
 2  preparation for high command        29
 3  the sicilian campaign               44
 4  missions in Italy                   56
 5  D day in Normandy                   70
 6  the Arnhem operation                85
 7  from the Bulge to Berchtesgaden     97
 8  superintendent of west point       112
 9  u.s. commander, Berlin             123
10  with the 8th army in Korea         131
11  post armistice Korea               149
12  army chief of staff                164
13  the bay of pigs                    178
14  the cuba report                    184
15  military representative of the president     195
16  nato problems                      204
17  southeast asia: 1961               216
18  mission to Saigon                  227
19  return to uniform                  245
20  CUba ── the secret crisis          261
21  Cuba quarantine                    271 
22  limited test ban treaty            282
23  the autumn of disaster             288
24  chairman JCS under president Johnson         304
25  Saigon kaleidoscope                315
26  playing a losing game              329 
27  the new strategy                   339 
28  end of mission                     348
29  presidential consultant            358
30  Vietnam preoccupations:  1966      367  
31  Vietnam:  1967                     374
32  the climatic year:  1968           381
33  lame-duck  consultant              393
34  lessons from Vietnam               399
35  adjustment to declining power      409 
 
index                                  423 

p.370
, there were three kinds of ground warfare
a so-called big war between the tactical units of both sides which was quite similar to the conventional combat we had known in Korea; 
a local war of guerrilla bands whose operations suggested the raids of Quantrill and his men along the MIssouri-Kansas border in our civil war; 
assassination, kidnapping, and other forms of terrorism as a calculated means of [...] for intimidating the civil population. 

books by Maxwell D. Taylor
   Swords and plowshares
   Responsibility and response
   The uncertain trumpet 

   Maxwell D. Taylor, Swords and plowshares   ])

p.490
Matt Ridgway
operation killer, 
Later he wrote, “I did not understand why it was objectionable to acknowledge the fact that war was concerned  with killing the enemy .... I am by nature opposed to any effort to ‘sell’ war to people as an only mildly unpleasant business that requires very little in the way of blood.”

pp.499─500
George Allen ── who as a young CIA field officer in Vietnam briefed Ridgway daily for several weeks as the French war in Indochina was coming to its climax in 1954, later said he had never dealt with a man so acute and demanding, not even Walter Bedell Smith, who had been Dwight Eisenhower's tough guy in Europe and later took over the CIA.   Ridgway's sense of the larger picture was so accurate, Allen believed, because of his determination to get the smallest details right.  It was Ridgway's subsequent report on what entering the war in Indochina would mean ── 500,000 to 1,000,000 men, 40 engineering battalions, and significant increases in the draft ── that helped keep America out of the war for a time.  

pp.499─500
Ridgway's obsession with intelligence.
; he was simply smarter than most great commanders.
, his belief that the better your intelligence, the fewer of your own men's lives you were likely to sacrifice.
A great deal of it was his training in the airborne, where you made dangerous drops behind enemy lines with limited firepower and were almost always outnumbered and vulnerable to larger enemy forces.
George Allen ── who as a young CIA field officer in Vietnam briefed Ridgway daily for several weeks as the French war in Indochina was coming to its climax in 1954, later said he had never dealt with a man so acute and demanding, not even Walter Bedell Smith, who had been Dwight Eisenhower's tough guy in Europe and later took over the CIA.   Ridgway's sense of the larger picture was so accurate, Allen believed, because of his determination to get the smallest details right.  It was Ridgway's subsequent report on what entering the war in Indochina would mean ── 500,000 to 1,000,000 men, 40 engineering battalions, and significant increases in the draft ── that helped keep America out of the war for a time.  

  ( The coldest winter : America in the Korean war / David Halberstam.──1st ed.; 1. korean war, 1950─1953──united states., DS 919.H35 2007, 951.904'240973──dc22, [2007], )

   David Halberstam, The coldest winter  ])

p.189
─“”

p.190
That contradiction dissolved as soon as I held in my hands Taylor's actual, personal recommendations to the president and the judgements on which he based them.  The press accounts of the time had simply been wrong.  The official statements were lies.

p.193
   I soon got a crucial commentary on this Kennedy paradox, as I thought of it, from his brother. 

pp.193─196
I was glad to have the chance to tell him what I had seen and what I thought should be done, but I also wanted to ask him about the period I was investigating for the McNamara study, the Kennedy decision making in 1961. 
   I told him briefly why I had picked that year to study and how I was now more puzzled than ever by the combination of decisions I found the president had made.  In rejecting ground troops and a formal commitment to victory, he had been rejecting the urgent advice of every one of his top military and civilian officials.  With hindsight, that didn't look foolish; it was the advice that looked bad.  Yet he did proceed to deepen our involvement, in the face of a total consensus among his advisers that without the measures he was rejecting, in fact without adopting them immediately, our effort were bound to fail. 
   I told Bobby it was hard to make sense out of that combination of decisions.  Did he remember how it came out that way?  I felt uneasy about describing the problem that way to the president's brother, but I knew it might be my only opportunity ever to get an answer, and his manner with me encouraged me to take the chance. 
   He thought about what I'd put to him for a moment and then said, “We didn't want to lose in Vietnam or get out. We wanted to win if we could. But my brother was determined never to send ground combat units to Vietnam.”  His brother was convinced, Bobby said, that if he did that, we'd be in the same spot as the French.  The Vietnamese on our side would leave the fighting to the United States, and it would become our war against nationalism and self-determination, whites against Asians.  That was a fight we couldn't win, any more than the French. 

pp.195─196
   But what wasn't clear to me was how Kennedy could have been so prescient in 1961, or where he would have gotten such a strong personal commitment, as to draw an absolute line against American ground combat in Vietnam.  Bobby had not said that his brother had already decided in 1961 to withdraw from Vietnam; he had simply told me that JFK preferred and intended to do that rather than to send ground troops, if it came to the point where those seemed the only two alternatives to imminent military defeat.  I hadn't heard any American ── among those reluctant to get out of Vietnam, for cold war reasons ── advancing that precise point of view before 1964 (though some, notably George Ball, didn't want to send even advisers).  Obviously none of Kennedy's most senior advisers shared it.  I also hadn't thought of JFK as having idiosyncratic opinions, let alone a conviction like that, about Indochina.  I asked, a little impudently, “What made him so smart?”
   Whap!  His hand slapped down on the desk.  I jumped in my chair.  “Because we were there!”  He slammed the desktop again.  His face contorted in anger and pain.  “We were there, in 1951. We saw what was happening to the French. We saw it. My brother was determined, determined, never to let that happen to us.”

pp.196─197
I wondered after listening to Bobby just what they had seen and heard in Vietnam that had shaped his thinking so strongly (and so well, as it looked to me by this time).   
How long had they been there? 
It was years before I learned the answer.
   One day, it turns out.  According to Richard Reeves, Kennedy recalled that day to Taylor and Rostow just before they left for Vietnam in October 1961. 

<start of block quote>
Kennedy told Taylor about his own experiences in Vietnam, which he had visited for a day in 1951 as a young congressman on an around-the-world tour.  He had begun that day in Saigon with the commander of the 250,000 French troops fighting Viet Minh guerrillas.  General Jean de Lattre de Tassigny had assured him that his soldiers could not lose to these natives.  He had ended the evening on top of the Caravelle Hotel with a young American consular officer named Edmund Gullion.  The sky around the city flashed with the usual nighttime artillery and mortar bombardment by the Viet Minh.
   “What have you learned here?” Kennedy asked the diplomat.
   “That in 20 years there will be no more colonies”, Gullion had said.  “We're going nowhere out here. The French have lost. If we come in here and do the same thing we will lose, too, for the same reason. There's no will or support for this kind of war back in Paris. THe home front is lost. The same thing would happen us.”
<end of block quote>

   Ask the right person the right question, and you could get the picture pretty fast.  

Reeves, Richard.  President kennedy : profile of power.  new york: simon and schuster, 1993.  
─“”

   (Secrets : a memoir of vietnam and the pentagon papers / daniel ellsberg., 1. vietnamese conflict, 1961─1975──unitd states., 2. pentagon papers., 3. ellsberg, daniel., DS558 .E44 2002, 959.704'3373──dc21, 2002, )
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Aeschylus (Robert McNamara)

  Robert S. McNamara, In retrospect : the tragedy and lessons of Vietnam, [1995]  p.xvii The ancient Greek dramatist Aeschylus wrote, “The r...